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These last years have witnessed the emergence and blossoming of practices inspired by
philosophy on the didactic and pedagogical scene. In this context, Socrates’s Philosophy
represents one main point of reference. Socratic dialogue is now a model for a maieutic
conception of teaching as well as for the constitution of dialogical communities and for an
interrogative enquiry into reality. However, at times this recovery of the Socratic model
is not exempt from misunderstandings and anachronisms. The aim of this article is to
underline the main differences between the ancient and contemporary method.
Socratic dialogue in the ancient world
Socratic dialogue as a literary genre emerges in Athens during the 4th century BC, im-
mediately after Socrates’ death in 399 BC, in order to bear testimony and leave a durable
trace of Socrates’ life and method.1 These instances are at the basis of the development
of the logoi sokratikoi genre, of which Plato is a proponent among many. The Socratic
method, as a dialogic practice experienced by various interlocutors, has obviously an ear-
lier origin, which can be traced back to the discursive or rhetoric practices characterizing
democratic Athens. Public speeches, orations, discussions in court mark the emergence of
an art of the word that is nurtured by democracy. Within this context, Socrates embodies
an educational methodology and an idea of philosophical research markedly distinct from
methodologies which were fashionable at the time, especially those of the sophists. Also
the sophists practiced dialogue with their disciples, but the purpose and characteristics of
1Some researchers argue that the Socratic dialogue as literary genre was already present during Socrates’
lifetime, assuming a didactic function. Cf. Rossetti (2011a).
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their method were different from the Socratic approach.
The first Platonic dialogues (the dialogues written by Plato immediately after the death of
Socrates; those credited as authentic by most scholars are: Apology of Socrates, Menex-
enus, Protagoras, Laches, Republic Book I, Charmides, Euthyphro, Lysis,Hippias Major,
Ion, Hippias Minor, Crito, Euthydemus, Cratylus, Gorgias,Meno) represent a vivid testi-
mony of the Socratic method: it is thus possible to extract from them crucial information
to delineate the general characteristics of this approach.2
The maieutical character of the Socratic dialogue
The first and fundamental feature of the method is that it is a maieutic method. Maieutics
(literally, midwifery) can be defined as an art which, by operating through dialogue (the
basic mode of dialogue is that of questions and answers), enables the soul to give birth
to the truth it seeks. The truth is already present in the soul of the seeker: the Socratic
questioning is the modality through which Socrates helps his interlocutor to discover the
truth he already possesses. The dialogue enables, within a joint research, to get closer
to the truth, it allows the interlocutor to find out the truth in first person, avoiding thus
dogmatic expositions on the teacher’s part. A knowledge which is not experienced in first
person by the interlocutor cannot be acknowledged as true, as it is necessarily perceived
by him/her as something external: accordingly, it does not possess the strength to compel
the subject towards a conduct consistent with its specifications.
Maieutic knowledge unfolds thus as a form of practice implying the transformation of
the subject involved in its elaboration. Through continuous questioning and answering,
Maieutics enables the questioning soul to generate what s/he already knows and possi-
bly, at a further stage, present discursively the knowledge it gave birth to. For the soul
to be ready it is necessary a preliminary cleansing work addressing errors, false beliefs,
stereotypes and prejudices; for achieving this purpose Socrates uses the Elenchos (refu-
tation). The Elenchos articulates two moments: firstly, the thesis of the interlocutor is
analyzed, secondly, objections are proposed. Examination and objections are strictly
interconnected—given their mutual dependency, the Elenchos can be defined as a re-
futing process which tends to generate a positive thesis. The moment of analysis enables
the individuation of contradictions intrinsic in the thesis, a process automatically result-
ing in its negation. The logical movement bringing to the negation of falsity is always
accompanied, in the Socratic Method, by a psychological movement through which the
interlocutor subjectivizes the contradictory character of his/her argument. If this moment
of awareness (moment of negativity) is lacking, the Elenchos is ineffective and it can-
not support the second phase of Socratic Maieutics, namely the production of a positive
thesis.3
2For an analysis of the Socratic method in Plato’s first dialogues, cf. L. Candiotto (2012a).
3The passage of the Plato’s Sophist describing the Noble Sophistic is enlightening in this sense, cfr.
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The practical relevance of the dialogue topic
The second key feature of the Socratic Method is its ethical, political and educational
relevance. The topics debated by Socrates and his interlocutors in the first Platonic dia-
logues establish always a strict connection between working on one’s self and improving
the life of the polis. Socrates urges the subject to take care of his soul in order to be
good, beautiful and just.4 The pedagogic valence of the Socratic Method builds upon this
basis: philosophical research is a pedagogical modality which Socrates shapes in order to
enable his interlocutors to improve. From this perspective, it is possible to affirm, with
Pierre Hadot (1995, 2002), that philosophical research, in its dialogic form, is Socrates’
and Plato’s main spiritual exercise. Furthermore, the debated themes are always interest-
ing for the interlocutor: the examples adopted by Socrates are interesting for him/her as
they always relate to his/her daily life. It is no coincidence then if in the Laches, where the
interlocutors are two strategists, the argument is courage, or if in the Charmides, where
the interlocutors are two figures that will play an important historical role in Athenian
politics (Critias and Charmides) the primary emphasis is on temperance. Socrates and
Plato, in fact, considered temperance as a necessary skill for a good politician. However,
these considerations imply neither that Socratic dialogues are always successful, nor a
constant openness on the part of Socrates’ interlocutors—quite the contrary. For instance,
in Gorgias it is possible to notice both ferocious defenses by the interlocutor and vio-
lent refutations by Socrates. In my opinion, this signals Socrates’ and Plato’s interest in
criticizing the political situation of the time through a refutation of its representatives. By
refuting Callices, Socrates demonstrates his inadequacy to the audience; Socrates is aware
that Callices is not willing to be “purified” and thus directs his elenctic action towards the
public attending the debate.
T e collaboration of interlocutors and their partaking in “a
philosophical form of life”
The third main feature concerns the type of relation which develops between Socrates and
his interlocutors.5 On the one hand, Socrates emphasizes that the interlocutors must col-
laborate towards a common goal (unveiling truth), rather than asserting their preeminence
through a kind of dialogical fight (this aspect marks a crucial difference from sophistry).
Philosophical research enacted through dialogue is thus a joint research, unfolding in a
collective context towards collective goals. This communitarian aspect is not accidental,
but a central prerequisite and instrument of orientation without which the research could
Plat., Soph. 230 b4–d4.
4For a contemporary reading of this theme, cfr. M. Foucault (2001).
5Elsewhere, I called this particular process “retroactive elenchos”. To approach this thememore in detail
cf. Candiotto (2012b).
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not be successful, not even at a gnoseological level. Of course, it is possible to think alone,
however in this case it is always necessary to test dialogically the correctness of what has
been thought. In general terms, apart from this case Socrates emphasizes how the truth
can be discovered maieutically only through dialogue, thus through a shared dimension
of research – even if the moment in which the truth is grasped is individual and cannot
be completely presented at a linguistic level. These various facets of the Socratic Method
are clearly delineated in Plato’s Seventh Letter (Plato, Seventh Letter, 340b–345c), where
the author underlines that philosophical research through dialogue is fruitful only if the
subjects involved in the dialogue partake in a common form of life, a philosophical form
of life, and the achievement of knowledge is a sudden event taking place in the soul of
the person involved in the dialogical activity. A fundamental nexus is thus established
between community and self-knowledge—intending with self-knowledge an intellectual
achievement which is not an end in itself but, again, oriented towards the communitarian
aspect of the common good.
For Plato, philosophy operates within a social network where the example and teaching
of a single person cannot suffice. The whole community must practice philosophy. Not
only political action supported by philosophy, but philosophical knowledge itself requires
a communitarian dimension. Also the aspect concerning theoria has to do with what is
common rather than individual. Plato argues in fact that philosophical knowledge emerges
in the individual soul thanks to the dialogue among people who share a given form of life
and which are constantly in contact with each other.
There neither is nor ever will be a treatise of mine on the subject [philosophy].
For it does not admit of exposition like other branches of knowledge; but
after much converse about the matter itself and a life lived together, suddenly
a light, as it were, is kindled in one soul by a flame that leaps to it from
another, and thereafter sustains itself.
(Plato, Seventh Letter, 341c4–d2)
The truth is grasped by each person by dialoguing with oneself and others. Truth is
never possessed achieved by a single individual: it cannot be grasped independently from
dialogical interaction except in rare cases, and even such cases require a proof of their
veridicity which can only be obtained within a discursive setting.
However, differently from Dionysius, they were aware that those [insights
acquired through dialogue] were not their own thoughts, but a “possession
shared amongst friends” of the Academy, emerged through that admirable
exchange of spiritual energies implying giving and receiving; in the mediation
of acting and experimenting, which establishes the academia as the highest
form and eternal model of any community of culture, education and life, the
4
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quintessence of any community of men bound by a reciprocal understanding.
(Stenzel 1966, p. 3026)
Only an adequate preparation or propaedeutic can lit the flame of philosophical knowl-
edge. This propaedeutic is obtained on the one hand through a form of communitarian
life, where interests and philosophical discussions are shared, on the other hand through a
quotidian individual study and through the radical choice to live a specific form of life—
namely, a philosophical one. It is crucial to emphasize how, from this perspective, the
highest forms of philosophical knowledge depend, on the one hand, on markedly material
circumstances—to live in a specific place, with certain people and during a given span of
time; on the other, on aspects which refer to a personal choice. Philosophical knowledge
cannot be enclosed in a dogmatic definition as it emerges in a particular “shape”, consub-
stantial with a relational-dialogic context. On the other hand, the relation ensuing between
Socrates qua proponent of Maieutics and his interlocutors is asymmetrical. Socrates,
although reiterating his lack of knowledge, guides his interlocutor towards pre-fixed av-
enues of enquiry, singles out viable paths through fictitious questions (Longo 2000) causes
paradoxes and aporias to expose errors, orientates the research towards themes that bring
into question the whole being of his interlocutor. Socrates is thus a guide that knows
where to lead his interlocutor, even if he does not know exactly which type of knowledge
such interlocutor will be able to attain. The asymmetry between Socrates maieutician and
his interlocutors is different from the traditional asymmetry that exists in the relationship
between teacher and disciple, where the teacher transmits a specific range of knowledge
to the disciple. The asymmetry between Socrates and his interlocutors is underlined by
Socrates’ solid methodological knowledge and in his role as a guide throughout the re-
search journey. In this sense, Socrates’ approach differs both from the dogmatic knowl-
edge typically transmitted by the traditional teacher and from the Sophists’ conception of
dialogue as deployment of dialectical weaponry functional to subdue the interlocutors.
The use of rhetorical strategies in the dialogue
In recent years, however, it has been pointed out (Kohan 2009; Rossetti 2011b) how
Socrates does not really listen to his interlocutors. Not unlike the Sophists, Socrates
makes use of a number of strategies to control the dialogue. Such strategies are the fourth
fundamental characteristic of the Socratic dialogue. Livio Rossetti furthers this thread
of analysis by emphasizing how the emotional style adopted by Socrates was intended
to corner his interlocutor. It is interesting, however, to understand why Socrates deemed
useful to push the interlocutor in difficult positions. Arguably, the strategy which effected
emotions was functional for what Socrates aimed to elicit in the interlocutor (and in the
public): not a substantive doctrine but the awareness of contradictions. The emotional
6My translation.
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preparation, creating a particular atmosphere, was functional to the interiorization of a
specific dilemma or latent problem. This process could bring the subject to live a lib-
erating emotion able of disclosing unexpected perspectives. Rossetti points out that the
effectiveness of the Socratic dialogue does not rest on the strength of the proposed argu-
ments (they are often incomplete or erroneous), but in rhetorical techniques which display,
among other things, a sapient use of emotions. Moreover, Socrates used to ridicule inter-
locutors and often enacted violent patterns of refutation. When he was more lenient he
applied, at most, a paternalistic style.
Rossetti’s reading enables us to grasp the rhetorical strategies used by Socrates. These
are specific dialogical modalities which aim to produce a given effect in the interlocutor.
Some of them may appear similar to the ones employed by the Sophists, however, in my
perspective, their different purpose marks a cleavage between the two: for Socrates the
ultimate aim of dialogical interaction is the improvement of the interlocutor (or the pub-
lic), through the recognition of one’s errors and, possibly, the achievement of truth, whilst
for the sophists the main goal is the agonistic defeat of the interlocutor as a way to obtain
fame, honor and glory. In fact, the Socratic asking invites constantly the interlocutor to
question him/herself within a perspective of “self-knowledge” and care of the self.
The self-improvement of the interlocutors as the purpose of the
dialogue
The model of philosophy proposed by Socrates is thus consistent with the definition of
philosophy as art of life (Horn 1998), as daily practice enabling to live a dignified life,
virtuous and therefore happy. Through a philosophic interpretation of the Delphic maxim
“know thyself”, Plato, through Socrates, establishes philosophy, and in particular philo-
sophical dialogue, as the most profound form of education available to individuals and
society.
This last aspect introduces a fifth characteristic, concerning the purpose of Socratic di-
alogue, and more specifically its gnoseological-ethical-political purpose, aiming to im-
prove both the individual and the polis that s/he inhabits. It is necessary to emphasize
here that the figure of Socrates qua model of philosopher is crucial for the development
of the ancient Socratic dialogue in its platonic acception.
Socrates embodies the philosopher who does not know but is aware of his lack of knowl-
edge. For this reason Socrates addresses those who think to possess knowledge; by declar-
ing his ignorance, he forces them to question their knowledge and to recognize its lack
of foundations. The beginning of any true research is in fact the awareness of one’s own
ignorance and the liberation from his/her own mistakes of judgment. Socrates defines his
research method as follows, speaking in first person:
6
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Of what sort am I? One of those who would be glad to be refuted if I say
anything untrue, and glad to refute anyone else who might speak untruly; but
just as glad, mind you, to be refuted as to refute, since I regard the former
as the greater benefit, in proportion as it is a greater benefit for oneself to be
delivered from the greatest evil than to deliver someone else. For I consider
that a man cannot suffer any evil so great as a false opinion on the subjects of
our actual argument.
(Plato, Gorgias, 458a)
Socratic dialogue leads to aporia, however aporia is not to be intended as a negative out-
come – it rather exemplifies a first great dialogical conquest: the awareness of error, of not
knowing. One main outcome of Socratic dialogue is thus an urgent need to continue re-
searching, starting in the first place from a process of self- examination. By investigating
the opinions of his interlocutors, Socrates enables them to call into question themselves
and their own mode of life.
Nicias: You strike me as not being aware that, whoever comes into close
contact with Socrates and has any talk with him face to face, is bound to be
drawn round and round by him in the course of the argument—though it may
have started at first on a quite different theme—and cannot stop until he is
led into giving an account of himself, of the manner in which [188a] he now
spends his days, and of the kind of life he has lived hitherto.
(Plato, Laches, 187e–188a)
Socrates possesses a knowledge different from those paradigms which were conventional
at the time, it is not a theory which can be taught but rather a sapience immediately
conducive to practice: the necessity to research and embody an ethical form of common
life. Socrates does not aim to limit the discussion to concepts such as “good”, “fair”,
“pious”, etc., but wishes that these concepts, once made available to the interlocutor by
means of rational demonstration, become for him/her a form of life. Crucially, Socratic
knowledge qua work on the self is an appeal to “being”. Socrates knows the value of
moral action as such action is implied by his own choice, on his personal commitment,
on a personal urgency to improve, and this is possible only starting from the awareness of
one’s own errors.
Accordingly, Socratic knowledge is “knowing how to live”. The “art of living” is a mode
of life oriented towards the good and animated by a constant strife to improve, to avoid
errors; this attitude prevents the occurrence of evil to the person who has embraced this
mode of existence.
. . . no evil can come to a good man either in life or after death. . .
(Plato, Apology, 41d)
7
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The contemporary method
The use of dialogue or discussion as philosophical inquiry (philosophical inquiry carried
out as a dialogue or discussion) is a philosophical practice that never disappeared and that
in the last forty years, thanks to a growing interest towards philosophical practices also by
non-philosophers or specialists and beyond strictly epistemological concerns, produced
(has been object of) a thriving experimentation in various fields and contexts. Hence
the emergence of various of initiatives to practice philosophical dialogue collectively:
Philosophy for children, Philosophy for Community, Cafe` Philo, etc.
Socratic dialogue can be included in this group of practices; during the 20th century
it has been redesigned in several formulations and re-proposed by various schools with
different purposes, not only philosophical. The method has been applied, especially in the
Anglo-Saxon world, in psychotherapy (especially cognitivist paradigms), in legal settings,
in context of conflict mediation, in health care settings, in companies to facilitate the
achievement of common objectives, in schools, etc. Here I will provide a general outline
of contemporary Socratic dialogue focusing in particular on its elaboration in the German
context. Arguably, such elaboration is the variant that remains closer to the spirit of
ancient Socratic dialogue, although differing from it in some respects.
The philosophical thread in question originated in Germany in the second decade of the
XX century, thanks to the work of Leonard Nelson and his disciples Gustav Heckmann
and Minna Specht. Methodologically, the starting point of Socratic dialogue is a question
that interests the research group and that is supported by a number of concrete examples.
Usually, a participant proposes a personal experience prompting a philosophical question,
which is thereby proposed to the group as starting point for research. Questions are gener-
ally related to moral and ethical fields, but can also refer to a gnoseological or ontological
dimension.
The basic question is formulated according to the Socratic ti esti, “what is x”? But it can
also assume different shapes. It is crucial, in order for a productive common research to
take place, that the participants find the question interesting and somehow close to their
personal experience (in this respect it is possible to detect a similarity between Socratic
dialogue and the first rule of biographic-supportive communication (Madera and Tarca
2007), which refers to autobiography and to a type of first-person philosophy). The initial
formulation of the question will therefore affect the whole course of the common enquiry.
Once the question is asked, participants examine examples drawn from concrete life ex-
periences: the discussion focuses, firstly, on the situation proposed by the participant who
formulated the question, secondly, on other examples illustrated by other subjects par-
ticipating in the dialogue. Starting from examples, philosophical research can produce a
knowledge which is embodied, rather than abstract or distant from the experiences of the
8
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research participants. This process enables—as Socrates knew—an immediate involve-
ment of interlocutors and the possibility of realizing the acquired knowledge in concrete
forms of life. From a gnoseological perspective, this process tends to privilege induction
over deduction and to emphasize how knowledge—also in its theoretical, general and
even universal acception—can be discovered starting from sensible experience.
The discussion follows the exposition and analysis of examples. During this moment, the
correctness of argumentative logic is emphasized, contradictions and fallacies are under-
lined whilst the group strives to individuate shared axioms. Incidentally, it is necessary
to point out here how main presuppositions of the method are both a kind of rationalism,
a specific confidence in human beings’ rational capacity of achieving a form of coherent
knowledge (a form of knowledge, itself rational) and a specific conception, typical of the
modern age, of understanding truth in its logical-mathematical formulation. Contempo-
rary philosophy highlighted the crisis of such model in different occasions. Whilst the va-
lidity of such position is open to debate, it is arguably necessary to be aware that adopting
the Socratic method implies assuming a certain epistemological paradigm, characterized
by its own strength and limitations. Also in the ancient method there was a tendency to-
wards rationalism, however, for Socrates, the main emphasis is on the moral purpose of
dialogical enquiry; Socrates was ready to set aside formal correctness if this could facili-
tate a moral improvement in the interlocutor (Dorion 2004). Anglo-Saxon commentators
interested in Socratic dialogue, operating from an analytical perspective, often underscore
logical inconsistencies in Socrates’ arguments. In my perspective, however, these incon-
sistencies signal how, for Socrates, logical correctness was a valid instrument, but not
the ultimate goal of the dialogue. Accordingly, in specific occasions it could be consid-
ered of secondary importance. Moreover, the “errors” were used with strategic purpose,
assuming thus a rhetorical role.
In terms of the subjective disposition of the participant, Socratic dialogue requires an at-
titude of sincerity towards oneself and others, as well as trust in one’s own capacity of
enquiry and in that of other participants. Socrates himself emphasized this aspect, point-
ing out how the attitude of the interlocutor towards the enquiry and his guide was crucial
to determine whether or not he could attain philosophical knowledge (Plato’s Gorgias is
exemplificative in this sense). In the dialogues written by Plato we often find interlocutors
who cannot achieve a productive attitude as they are perched on their positions, unwilling
to admit their mistakes. They do not trust Socrates, believing that he aims to obtain a
heuristic-agonistic victory rather than to help them. Plato describes these characters—
mostly sophists, rhetoricians, orators, politicians—in order to criticize Athenian society,
demonstrating their low moral qualities and the way in which they pursue a life of fame,
honor and glory.
Moreover, Plato staged hostile interlocutors for emphasizing Socrates’ figure. Socrates
was the teacher whose main activity was to liberate his interlocutors from error through
strategies which were at times violent and that affected their emotions, and who subse-
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quently guided them in the search for truth. Accordingly, in the ancient Socratic dialogue
finding hostile interlocutors was almost the norm.
The contemporary Socratic dialogue is, however, a freely chosen philosophical practice
characterized by a form of symmetry among all the participants. Therefore, the above
mentioned dynamics do not take place, except in the form of accidents due to participants’
inability to maintain the required behavior. A positive disposition of the participants is
thus a necessary prerequisite to implement the philosophical practice in question.
There is no figure like Socrates in the present Socratic dialogue. Within research groups,
there is a moderator which acts more as a facilitator, rather than as a teacher or guide.
His/her task is neither to orient discussion nor to intervene in relation to contents, but
to verify that, during each step of the research, participants proceed with order towards
shared forms of knowledge – forms which are obtained through a progressive agreement
concerning the various points under discussion. We could say that each participant has
the task of playing Socrates’ role both for him/herself and for others.
It is thus possible to notice that the underlying assumptions of ancient and contempo-
rary Socratic dialogues are noticeably different. In the first one, the truth to be known is
already ontologically posited and the subjects participating in the dialogue follow a com-
mon path, punctuated by questions and answers, which leads them, thanks to an expert
guide (Socrates), to approach truth maieutically. In the second case, truth is not prede-
termined but constructed within the dialogical-linguistic context through an agreement
between research participants. In the first case, Socrates does not necessarily listened to
his interlocutors, in the second availability to listen, empathy and sharing are essential
conditions. The journey undertook by the subjects participating in contemporary So-
cratic dialogues is constructive, rather than revelatory. Ancient Socratic dialogue strove
to achieve Truth whilst contemporary Socratic dialogue is in search of shared truths.
This fundamental difference—based on the role of the facilitator, the relation between
facilitator and interlocutors and the type of knowledge underpinning the entire process—
depends on profound differences between the epochs and cultures in which these dialogic
practices were implemented and between the overall conceptual frameworks of orienta-
tion animating their proponents.
Within fourth century Athens, Plato aimed to distance himself from the risks characteriz-
ing the emerging democracy—a political form which, in conjunction with the Sophists’
teachings, resulted for him in relativism and instability in the ontological, gnoseological,
moral and political fields. Against this risk, Plato constructed Socratic dialogues having
as main point of reference a stable and universal ontology, which could support stable
ethical and political instances. The 1920’s in Germany, conversely, are characterized by
the emergence of National Socialism, and Socratic dialogue was intended by Nelson as a
practice of freedom, resistance and democratic struggle against dictatorial and totalitarian
tendencies.
10
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The cultural and political backgrounds are thus extremely different and in some ways
opposite. This is, in my opinion, the main reason behind the methodological difference
separating ancient and contemporary forms of Socratic dialogue. In both cases, however,
the dialogical practice was experienced as an activity which enabled a space of oppo-
sition vis-a`-vis the dominant ideology of the times, thus the emergence of critical and
autonomous thinking in the people participating in the dialogue.
The Socratic dialogue of German mold, not unlike the ancient Socratic dialogue handed
down by Plato, is characterized by a marked political and pedagogical valence, an aspect
that in other contemporary formulations of Socratic dialogue is not equally central.
Accordingly, in spite of the above mentioned substantial differences between the ancient
method and the contemporary German approach, the latter can be considered as the wor-
thiest heir of the spirit and attitude animating the former. Arguably, present forms adopt-
ing the Socratic method instrumentally, without a political and pedagogical background
and using the method as a self-referential communicative strategy rather than as a path-
way to improvement where the logical dimension is subordinated to the moral dimension
involving the participants, risk in some cases to be closer to the method of the Sophists
than to that of Socrates.
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